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THE STABILITY OF THE DNIESTER 
MOLDOVAN REPUBLIC: 
A POST-ELECTORAL ANALYSIS74 
Oazu Nantoi, Stephen R. Bowers, Valeria Ciobanu, and Marion T. Doss, Jr. 
Executive Summary 
The communists' electoral victory and the elevation of Voronin to the Presidency 
drew Moldova closer to the Russian Federation and raised new questions about the 
stability of the Dniester Moldovan Republic. .. . . . 
The existence of the DMR no longer serves RussIan 111terests as It dId 111 the past. 
The prospects for confrontation between the DMR and Moldova are greater today 
as a result of the Communist Party victory. 
While President Voronin has privately expressed his disdain for the DMR 
leadership, he seems willing to accept the existence of the ?MR... .' 
By the latter part of the past decade, the DMR eXIsted pnmanly as a veiucle for 
criminal activities rather than as a bastion of Stalinism and Russian nationalism. 
Weapons left behind by Soviet forces have made the DMR a major factor in 
illegal arms trafficking. 
74 In the interest of clarity, this paper refers to the Moldovan separatist entity east of the Dniester River as 
either Transdniestria or the Dniester Moldovan Republic (DMR) to distinguish it from the Republic of 
Moldova. Most nations do not recognize the D)\1R as a nation, however. 
The terms "eastern" and "western" Moldova refer to territories to the east or west of the Dniester River. 
That river runs down the eastern half of Moldova, not the center. Therefore, lor the purposes of tillS paper, 
"western" Moldova refers to the western and central sections of Moldova. 
This aper contains information that has been provided "on background." In these cases, no reference is 
madePto the information source. It was also impossible, in some instances, to guarantee the accuracy of th~ 
data. Nevertheless, the authors assume complete responsibility for the conclUSIOns and assessments made 10 
this work. 
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The Presence of Russian Federation Troops in Eastern Moldova 
The Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence on the August 27, 1991 
following the disintegration of the USSR. At that time, there were about 30,000 Soviet 
soldiers in 36 military garrisons on the territory of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic. Most of the units belonged to the 14th Army. These troops found themselves in 
a legal void. Meanwhile, separatist insurgencies in Transdniestria and Gagauzia and the 
massive arrival in Moldova of Russian mercenaries (most notably, Don Cossacks) made 
the creation of the Republic of Moldova National Army and the clarification of the legal 
status of former Soviet military units an urgent matter.75 
On November 14, 1991, the equipment of the former Soviet military units in the 
Republic of Moldova was declared property of the state (Decree No. 234 of the President 
of the Republic of Moldova). On March IS, 1992, the President of the Republic of 
Moldova issued a decree assuming jurisdiction over military formations located in 
Moldova. These measures served as a legal basis for the creation of the National Army, 
but provoked a negative reaction in Moscow. As a result, on March 20, 1992 the 
Government of the Republic of Moldova and the General Staff of the United Army 
Forces of the CIS signed an agreement regarding the status of military forces of the 
fonner USSR located in Moldova. According to this treaty, about ISO military units in 
Moldova were to pass under the authority of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of 
Moldova. Another 50 units, considered strategic by the Russians, would remain under 
CIS control. The units of the CIS were scheduled to withdraw from the territory of the 
Republic of Moldova by January 1,1993. 
The situation in the localities in eastern Moldova became very serious, however. 
The units of the 14th Army were in an extremely tense atmosphere. Separatists were 
already destroying the state structures of the Republic of Moldova. Stores of weapons and 
ammunition were assaulted by crowds searching for weapons for separatist forces. As a 
consequence, it was common for officers of the 14th Army to formally pass to the 
reserves, then immediately receive jobs at the plants from the Industrial Military 
Complex of the fonner USSR. At the same time they became members of the Labor 
Detachments of Collaboration with the militia, the Territorial Emergency Detachments 
and the Dniestrean National Guard. The amorphous structures of the CIS could not 
control the situation. Consequently, on April 1, 1992, President Boris Yeltsin issued a 
decree regarding Russian military units which, in effect, invalidated the CIS-Moldova 
Agreement. 
Open intervention of the 14th Army on the side of the separatists began 
immediately after the Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence. In September 
1991, the commander of the 14th Army, General Iakovlev, accepted an appointment as 
President of the Supreme Council of Defense of the Dniester Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic. An open transfer of armament to the paramilitary formations of separatists and 
mercenaries took place. In Spring 1992, separatist troops also obtained heavy armament 
such as tanks and artillery (including Grad mUltiple rocket launchers) from the 14th 
Army. There were cases when entire units passed under the authority of the DMR. The 
14th Army openly intervened in the conflict on the side of the separatist regime in spring-
summer 1992, ensuring its salvation. 
75 Gagauzia is in southern Moldova. The Gagauz people are Christians of Turkish extraction. They make up 
about 3.5% of the population of Moldova (including Transdniestria). 
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By the end of 2000, there were no Russian troops .west of the ~niester and 14th 
Army had been reduced to about 2,SOO soldiers (mostly natIve to the regIOn) and renamed 
the Operative Group of Troops. The unit consist~d of the Sth Motorized Infantry.Brigade 
with an attached tank battalion and transport helicopter squadron. Its armament 1I1cludes 
119 tanks, 129 armored fighting vehicles, 129 artillery pieces, 36 anti-tank launchers and 
7 helicopters. . .. . 
Ammunition stores are another problem. Most RUSSian matenel 111 Moldova IS 
kept at the village of Colbasna. The ammunition stock~ in C,olbasna ,:ere created for the 
needs of the 14th Army. However, when the evacuatIon of the Soviet troops from the 
eastern European states began, Colbasna's ammunition holdings .e.xpanded considerably. 
In 1991 the stores' commandant reported 45,951 tons of ammUI1ltlOn on hand. However, 
in 1994' within the framework of the negotiations regarding military equipment on the 
territory' of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian military reported only 24,266 tons. This 
discrepancy has raised suspicions that ammunition l~as passed. to the paramilita~y 
formations of the DMR. On October 21, 1994, the RUSSian FederatIOn and the Republic 
of Moldova signed an agreement that stipulated that Russian troops shoul~ be e~acuated 
in three years?6 Alerted by that agreement, the ~~paratist leader I!S0r Sm1l'11Ov Issued a 
decree that banned the evacuation of the ammUI1ltlOn from the temtory of the DMR and 
declared it the property of the "Transdniestria people." In 1994, the stores at Colbasna 
were divided into two parts, one of which is controlled and guarded by the DMR (the 3rd 
Motorized Infantry Battalion from Rybnitsa).77 Since there is a frontier post at the stor~s' 
exit, manned by troops from the State Security Mini~try of the DMR, the separatist 
regime controls the removal of armament from both se~tIO~s of the stores: 
The acceptance in 1996 of the Russian FederatIOn 1I1to the CounCil of Europe was, 
conditioned on the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Moldov~. ?n the eve ?f 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OS~E) sUlmmt I~ Istan~u.l 111 
November 1999, the Russian Federation evacuated three trams loaded With aUXIlIary 
equipment as a symbolic gesture, but the Russia.n Federation still ,?aintains a milita? 
'esence in Transdniestria. The Russian FederatIOn blames separatist leaders for then' r~ilure to complete the evacuation. On June 17, 2000,. ~ Russian representative in Vienna 
presented the schedule of evacuation fOJ: the ammUI1ltlon: but claImed that the schedule 
could be followed only with the cooperatIOn of the separatIst leaders. 
At present, the situation regarding the evacuation of. troops, and ammun!ti?n 
remains unclear. On the eve of the meeting of the OSCE Mmlsters of External AffaIrs 
from Vienna on November 27, 2000, Russia made another symbolic gesture, removing 
50 wagons of auxiliary equipment. On November 23, the DMR's president, minister of 
state security, and minister of external affairs were invited to Moscow. by the Secretary of 
the Security Council of the Russian Feder.ation to discuss the eva~uatlOn schedule. ",,:~en 
they came back to Tiraspol, the separatIst leaders pre.sented thIS st~p as part o~ . the 
Agreement Protocol on Military and Property Issues,".slgned by Russlan.PrIme Mmlster 
Victor Chernomyrdin and the Transdniestrian separatIst \eader, Igor SI~lrnov on ~arch 
20, 1995 at Odessa. This protocol, signed with the tacit agreeme.nt ot the RepublIc of 
Moldova, stipulates the separation of the materiel into three categorIes: 
76 The Russian Duma has not ratified this treaty. In November of 1995, the Duma passed a resolution 
declaring Transdniestr a zone of strategic Russian interests. . ' 
77 Tl' b Italion has about 350 soldiers and is equipped With armored personnel earners, a battery of 
mult:;le ~ocket launchers, a battery of six MT-12 anti-tank guns, and an anti-aircraft battery of ZU-23-2s. 
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Materiel of the Operative Group of Troops; 
Materiel that must be unconditionally evacuated to the territory of the Russian 
Federation; 
Materiel that can be sold (The proceeds to be divided in proportion of 50% to 50% 
between the Russian Federation and the DMR). 
The destiny of the Russian military presence in Transdniestria will depend largely on 
the evolution of the political situation within the Republic of Moldova. The Russian 
Federation actively influenced the political situation in the Republic when Petru 
Lucinschi was President by enlisting the support of the Moldovan Communist Party, the 
Russian language press and Russian secret services. The desired goal was to bring to 
aovernance, through the democratic process, pro-Moscow political forces. Such a 
development would, they believed, facilitate a Moldovan merger with the Russia-Belarus 
Union, Russian military bases in Moldova and the establishment of Russian as the official 
second language of the state. This, in tllrn, could encourage pro-Russian sentiments in the 
Ukraine. The communist victory in the 200 I elections indicated that this strategy as a 
sound one. 
Historical Background 
On March 27, 1915, after the disintegration of the Russian Empire, most of what 
is now the Republic of Moldova became part of Romania. The slice of Moldova east of 
the Dniester remained part of Russia. In 1924, it became the Moldovan Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR). In 1940, the USSR annexed the rest of Moldova. In 
August 1994, combining the recently annexed territory with the MASSR, Soviet 
authorities created the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR). The Soviets created 
an anti-Romanian phobia to avoid questions from the local population about the legality 
of annexation of 1940 and formation of the MSSR. In schools, the period between 1915 
and 1940 (when western Moldova was part of Romania) was presented as "the period of 
Romanian-Fascist occupation." From the very first days after the annexation, the Soviet 
regime attacked entire social groups. Teachers, priests, former officials and farmers 
(especially those who opposed forced collectivization) were all assaulted. Repeated 
forced deportations to Kazakhstan and Siberia took place from 1941 to 1949. Forced 
collectivization and a terrible drought in 1947 resulted in a famine in which at least 
200,000 people died of malnutrition. Though there was no food, the Communist regime 
prohibited the free movement of the local popUlation to other areas from the USSR. The 
official historiography addressed the famine only after the collapse of the USSR. 
Meanwhile, attacks were directed against the population's historical memory and 
culture. Churches were destroyed. Subscription to the Romanian press was prohibited 
(only in the MSSR, not in the other Soviet republics) as was the sale of literature 
published in Romania. With the replacement of the Latin alphabet with Cyrillic, the 
Romanian spoken by the local population was now called "Moldovan." The fiction that 
Moldovan was a language rather than a dialect was pushed to the extent that Moldovan 
KGB officers received a bonus of 15% of their salary for foreign language (Romanian) 
aptitude. Simultaneously, the idea that the Moldovan nation had no connection to 
Romania was insistently imposed. 
From 1940, the Soviets changed the ethnic composition of the population of 
Moldova. Despite the fact that the population density of the MSSR was the highest in the 
USSR (127 persons/square km), there was an influx of Russians. These new arrivals did 
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not know the language of the local population or the history of this territory and the 
majority of them were citizens of the USSR. Meanwhile, Moldovans were sent to other 
Soviet republics under various programs (mobilization to forced work, etc.). 
The ethnic composition of Transdniestria is more russified than that of western 
Moldova. Many of the Russian immigrants had been factory workers who had been sent 
to work in the more industrialized Transdniestria region. In addition, retired soldiers, 
most of whom were Russians, often settled in Tiraspol and Bender.
78 
In western 
Moldova, 69.5% of the population is Moldovan or Romanian and 20.5% is Russian or 
Ukrainian. In Transdniestria, 58% is Russian or Ukrainian (In Tiraspol more than 80% of 
the population is of Slav origin.) and 40% are Moldovan or Romanian. In Transdniestria, 
the concentration of Soviet troops was much higher than in western Moldova. 
The conflict started with disputes over national languages. In 1989, in the MSSR, 
the "Moldovan" language was declared as the state language (recognizing, however, that 
it is essentially the same as Romanian), though the Latin alphabet was re-imposed. 
Transdniestrian separatists insisted on keeping the Cyrillic alphabet. By and large, .. the 
Moldovan government did not press the issue, but in many places Moldovan zealots fired 
79 
or demoted citizens who did not speak the language. 
The political confrontations on linguistic issues were accompanied by con~icts 
over Moldova's status. The Moldovan Popular Front rode a call for natIOnal 
independence to overwhelming victory in the 1990 parliamen.tary ele~~ion.s. On.ce 
independence was declared, however, the Popular Front called f.a r r~u11lflcatlOn. wl~h 
Romania. This caused unrest in the industrial centers of Transd11lestna. Transd11lestna 
had never been part of Romania until 1941-1944 when Romania (allied with Nazi 
Germany) controlled this territory. The cruel realities of the wartime occupation di,d not 
d ·, I' 80 engender a positive image of Romania in the eyes of the Trans 11Iestnan popu atlOn. 
Shortly after the Language Act, the United Council of Work C~\Iectiv~s (~ST~) 
was formed in Tiraspol. The OSTK's stated goal was to combat Romal1lan natIOnalism 111 
Moldova. In the 1990 parliamentary elections, the OSTK won most of the seats from the 
Transdniestria region, while the Moldovan Popular Front w?n an overwh~lmi.ng majority 
of the seats from the rest of the country. The delegates from Transdl1lestna soon left 
Chisinau, however, citing threats and violence by Popular Front supporters. Tw? w~eks 
after the Gagauzian declaration of autonomy on AUg~lSt 19,. 1990, Transdl1les~nans 
created their own republic (September 2, 1990). Almost ll~medJat~ly, ther.e were vlOl~nt 
encounters between separatists and government forces. Sll1ce, thIS conflict was takll1g 
place in an area still under Soviet authority, there was no out-and-out warfare between 
the factions. 
That changed in August 1991. Following the failed coup in .Moscow (a coup 
supported by some DMR leaders), Chisinau declared Moldovan II1dependence. In 
78Bendcr is located on the western side of the Dniestr. Because it is directly across the Dniestr frol~l 
Tiraspol and is esscntially Tiraspol's "sister city," it was occupied by the DMR. It IS the only city m 
western Moldova occupied by the DMR. . .. 
79Later, in 1993, there would be similar persecution in the DMR. Teachers and olflctals opposed to the 
continued usc of Cyrillic were dcmotcd or fired. .... 
BOThe population of the rest of Moldova turned out to be no morc enthusIasttc. In a rcferendumm March 
1994,95% of the population voted to remain independent. Thc Popular Front, by Ignoflng overwhelmmg 
public opposition to reunification went from a position of dominance in Moldovan pohttcs to onc .of 
irrelevance. By then, however, relations bctween DMR Icadcrs and the government of the Repubhc were 
beyond repair. 
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September, agents from Chisinau kidnapped Igor Smirnov, the OSTK's leader, from the 
Ukraine. After a separatist blockade of the railway running from Moldova to the Ukraine 
(through Transdniestria) caused economic disruption in Moldova, Smirnov was released, 
In December, shortly after his release, Smirnov was elected president of the DMR with 
65% of the vote. By spring of 1992, armed clashes between Republican and DMR forces 
were commonplace. 
From the beginning of the conflict, Transdniestrian separatists used violence 
against their opponents. Armed "guardians" inspected villages opposed to separatism and 
intimidated the population. Job dismissals, intimidation, even murder of active opponents 
of separatism, led to an exodus to the western side of the Dniester (about 25 thousand 
persons before the outbreak of open warfare),81 As a result, the Republic of Moldova lost 
its grip on the eastern region and open opponents of separatism within the DMR became 
increasingly isolated, and therefore guarded in their actions and utterances, 
Russian Involvement in Moldova 
Russian Federation experts categorically deny that Russia has supported 
separatism and claim that Russia has involved herself in this conflict because it was 
necessary and no other country would. However, the content of the first document signed 
by the Russian Federation as peacekeeper in Transdniestria supports allegations of 
interventionism, That document was signed in Moscow on July 21, 1992 by the 
presidents of the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation. The document created 
a security zone administered by a Unified Control Commission (UCC), which included 
members from the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and the DMR. The 
agreement allowed separatist leaders to maintain the full control over the eastern region 
of the Republic of Moldova and to be protected by peacekeeping forces of the Russian 
Federation.82 Understandably, this protection has made the leadership of the DMR less 
willing to compromise than it would be without such protection. The creation of the state 
structures of Transdniestria continued under the cover of the 14th Army and with 
political, military, economic and informational support from the Russian Federation. 
Formally, this process ended with the adoption through referendum of the constitution of 
the DMR on December 24, 1995. 
The Russian mass media has strongly endorsed the positions of the separatists in 
Transdniestria. As a result, the Russian public has come to view the Republic of Moldova 
as an aggressor and Transdniestria as a defender of the Russophone popUlation's rights, 
There is clearly a pro-DMR lobby in the State Duma of the Russian Federation, 
The Duma has not yet ratified the treaties between Moldova and Russia signed by both 
parties in 1990 and 1993. The Duma has repeatedly taken provocative stances regarding 
Transdniestria. There have been proposals for bilateral treaties between Russia and the 
DMR. The DMR has been visited many times by Duma deputies, The Duma has created 
a "Commission for Contribution to Settlement of Political and Economic Situation in 
Transdniestria." Every time elections take place in Transdniestria (illegal from the point 
Rl On Deccmber 8, 1991, general elections were held in Moldova. The mayor of the village of Caragas on 
the eastcrn side of the Dnicstr, organized an evcnt for a presidential candidate. Later, he was found dead in 
a weIl. 
82 On July 2,1992, forces o[the Republic o[Moldova attempted to recapturc Bender. The offensive was 
called off when Russian tanks stationed in Tiraspol moved into Bender. 
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of view of the Republic of Moldova) Russian de~uties assist as "i~ternational obser:ers" 
d d I . tl1em "free and democratic" despite the protests from the Republic of an ec me . . DMR .. . 
Moldova. The Russian Federation insists that representatives ?f the . partiCipate. 111 
the negotiation of the treaty on friendship and collaboratiOn between the RUSSian 
Federation and the Republic of Moldova. . 
The stability of the DMR stems largely from, th~ fact that the r.egllne serves 
R . . t ts The. education system in Transdniestna IS based on RUSSian standards. usslan \11 eres . ' . . 
Transdniestrian children study from Russian books. Studies at. the State .Umverslty 111 
Tiraspol are based on Russian standards and th~ University of Tlrasp~l IS part o~ the 
Russian Association of Universities. The RUSSian Orthodox Church IS also actively 
supporting the separatist regime. . , . . . . ' 
All the leaders of the DMR are CitIzens of the RUSSian FedelatiOn and trav~l to 
different states with Russian foreign passports. Moscow sends the.se I~<~ders o~ missions. 
Some of them were included on the election lists of the liberals of Zhl1'lnov.skl and of ~he 
"Stalinist Block for the USSR" at the last elections in ~he ~uma of the Russ:an 
Federation. Tiraspol encourages inhabitants of Transdmes~r:a to adopt Russ:an 
. , h' Abo t 65 000 persons have already become cItizens of the RUSSian CItizens Ip. U, . ' .., R . . .. . 
Federation. We can suppose that thiS push to mcrease the pIOpOrt1.an ~f usslan cI~lzens 
in Transdniestria is aimed at providing a pretext for future RUSSian I11terference 111 the 
internal affairs of Moldova. 
There is a consular section of the Russian Embassy in Tiraspol: T.hough the 
Russian Federation does not officially recognize the DMR, the presence ot thiS ~onsular 
section lends the regime credibility. On November 2, 2000, ,the consular sectiOn Signed ~n 
agreement with the Edinstvo (Unity) movement regardmg the procedure to obtam 
citizenship and foreign passports. The pro-Russian Edinstvo. movem~nt came .to 
prominence after the implosion of the Popular Fro~t. The evolution of Edlllstvo ,and It~ 
support from the Russian Federation suggest that tlus ;nay be an attempt to Implemen.t ,I 
"Costunica" scenario, with a controversial leader (Smlrnov) replace~ by lT~ore attractive 
leaders (Edillstvo). The Republic of Moldova would thus los~ o,ne of Its m.aJor argumen~s 
(freeing the DMR's population from dictator~hip) for I:egammg sovereignty over t~1\S 
territory. Understandably, Igor Smirnov and hiS compal11ons had an e~tremely negatl:e 
reaction to this development because they fear that the Russian Federation could stake ItS 
future on Edillstvo and they could be shunted aside. . . . 
The Russian Federation also supports the DMR by provldmg orders for Its 
products. There is also ~ndustrial co?peration. ~rad ml~ltiple ~?cket. la~nchers a~e 
assembled at Transdniestnan plants usmg parts pIOd~ced at ~uss.lan plants. The I~era 
company, which is affiliated with Gazprom from RUSSia, has pnv<:tlzed the metallur~lcal 
plant in Rybnitsa (a city in northern Transdniestria~, which proVides about 60:0 of the 
budget of the DMR (This privatization was ,I~ade m ,the absence of an adequate ~~~al 
framework, yet Chisinau was silent.). In addltl~n, ~unng the las~ ten years the RUSSian 
Federation has delivered natural gas to Transdmestna. The DMR s debts for gas already 
exceed $500 million, but the Russian Federation continues to accept token payments of 
goods in lieu of cash. " . . 
Perhaps not every action by RUSSians m Moldova has been sanctiOned by 
M Undoubtedly there were renegade actions. In 1989-1992 the USSR and the oscow., k I ' 
Russian Federation experienced the kind of political chaos that ma 'es suc 1 aCtl.ons 
'bl H Inany official Russian acts have benefited the separatists. POSSI e. owever, 
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Government actions are driven largely by self-interest, and it is undeniably in the best 
interests of the Russian Federation is to transform the Republic of Moldova into an 
unofficial protectorate of the Russian Federation. Such an outcome could serve as a lever 
of influence on the Ukraine and Romania. In addition, key decision makers in the Russian 
Federation still regard Transdniestria as the key to Balkans. Some Russian military 
experts believe that the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Transdniestria would 
considerably reduce the military potential of Russian bases in the Crimea. 
Transdniestrian Smuggling and Chisinau 
When the Republic of Moldova lost the control over Transdniestria, this separatist 
region became a hub of illegal enterprises. The fact that DMR authorities have access to 
an official Republic of Moldova customs stamp facilitates such activities.s3 The most 
important of these is the smuggling of excised goods - alcohol, tobacco, and oil. 
Smugglers take products through the section of the frontier that is controlled by the DMR 
(The DMR controls the entire eastern frontier with the Ukraine.). The smugglers declare 
that the products are going to be transited through Transdniestria. They therefore do not 
pay any customs duties or excise taxes. In fact, many of them never arrive on the left side 
of the Dniester River and another part is distributed in many countries. About 60% of the 
oil products brought on the territory of Moldova is smuggled, Transdniestria has also 
become a center of a criminal international network that deals in smuggled cigarettes. 
This business is monopolized by the Sherif firm that is protected by the DMR's Ministry 
of State Security. The official import per capita of the excised goods, only through the 
customs that are controlled by the Republic of Moldova, is about 20 times greater in 
Transdniestria than in Moldova. In fact, Igor Smirnov has named his son President of the 
State Customs Committee. The annual volume of illegal transactions that were performed 
only through the section of the frontier that is controlled by the RepUblic of Moldova 
exceeds the sum of $500 million. 
Illegal anns sales are another income source for the DMR. For example, it is 
known that seven Grad multiple rocket launchers, which were produced at the Pribor 
plant in Bender, reached Abkhazian separatists in Georgia. Additional weapons from the 
DMR arsenals were shipped to the Middle East as well as Central Asia. While current 
and former Moldovan officials are reluctant to speak openly, persistent rumors place 
these weapons in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 1999, Moldovan police arrested a group 
of DMR soldiers for illegal sale of anTIS and munitions (plastic explosives and detonators, 
thermobaric projectile launchers and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles). The group was led by 
Colonel Nemkov who is the deputy commander of the local Russian peacekeeping forces. 
Nemkov and his group were apprehended by Moldovan authorities in Bender, a city that 
lies on the dividing line between the DMR and the Republic of Moldova. On the same 
day, Colonel Nemkov's son, an officer in the DMR Ministry of Security, and two 
military associates, were stopped driving a Moskvitch sedan which was towing a trailer. 
The trailer contained three Igla ground to air rockets and military telescopes designed for 
sniper rifles. While Nemkov was convicted in a Chisinau court for trading in illegal 
weapons, he received a pardon and was immediately released. Upon his return to 
Tiraspol, he was allowed to resume his position as deputy commander of the Russian 
peacekeeping forces. 
HJ Interview with the Honorable John Stewart, US Ambassador to Moldova, Chisinau, 22 May 1997, 
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S also sold to Chechnya. In March 2000, Russian 
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and contributed to the consolidation of the Transdniestrian state system. He then came 
back to Chisinau to serve as a deputy from 1994 to 1998. The case of Serghei Gradinari is 
another example. Gradinari was a deputy in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova 
from 1994 to 1998. Immediately after that, Smirnov appointed him Minister of Finance in 
the DMR government. This position could be a payoff for his support of Transdniestrian 
interests in previous years. 
Repression in the DMR 
Much of the DMR's stability can be attributed to the regime's repression of the 
Transdniestrian population. The DMR's constitution proclaimed that the DMR was "a 
democratic, sovereign, independent, legal state." The document contains no reference to 
the Republic of Moldova and prohibits (Article 8) activity aimed against the sovereignty 
of the Republic. This provision has allowed leaders from Tiraspol to take repressive 
measures against opponents of separatism. The Ministry of State Security persecutes 
attempts by Transdniestrian residents to participate in the politics of the Republic of 
Moldova. 84 The Helsinki Committee for the Human Rights of the Republic of Moldova 
revealed that officials from the Ministry of State Security in Tiraspol have arrested the 
citizens from western Moldova for engaging in political activity in Transdniestria. The 
same ministry hinders every attempt to organize international human rights organizations. 
On September 30, 1994, Igor Smirnov issued Decree No. 222 regarding 
"protection of the population from gangsterism and from other manifestations of the 
organized crime." According to this decree, every suspicious person can be held in 
preventive detention for 30 days. Independent lawyers, such as Chisinau attorney 
Vyatcheslav Turcanu, have access to data on torture at the detention centers and have 
spoken freely about conditions in DMR facilities. In Transdniestria, the citizens do not 
have the right to defend their rights in court because the judiciary is state-controlled in 
the Soviet style, 
The Ministry of State Security has become an instrument of election fraud. For 
example, V. Osadciuk, the president of the Tiraspol Election Commission, a body which, 
in December, 2000, was created for elections to the Supreme Soviet of the DMR, is a 
colonel from this ministry. His initial appointment and his subsequent behavior have 
demonstrated the crucial role of the DMR police in securing predictable election results. 
Even before creation of the Election Commission, the police presence at elections was 
significant and the role of the police in "electioneering" was remarkable even by post-
Soviet standards. Not only did the Ministry count the ballots, it also helped get out the 
vote on election day. 
Though inhabitants of Transdniestria have access to Moldovan broadcasts and 
pUblications, the DMR's print and broadcast media is strictly censored. The population is 
regularly intimidated with the "danger of unification with Romania." The Republic of 
Moldova is portrayed as an aggressor in 1992 and as a possible aggressor in the future. 
This biased media has fanned the fires of separatism. 
H·I In 1994, DMR authorities formally forbade voting in the Moldovan parliamentary elections. In the 1998 
elections, there was no formal stricture, but voting was aggressively discouraged, and only about 3,000 
Transdniestrians voted. 
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Relations with the Ukraine and Romania 
Separatist leaders have cultivated relations with the Ukraine. Bec~use the Ukrai~e 
shares a border with the DMR, the Republic of Moldova cannot orgal11ze an economic 
blockade of separatist region without the Ukraine's cooperat.ion. In additio.n, the J?MR 
benefits from a tremendous volume of smuggled goods passll1g through tillS frontier to 
and from the seaports of Odessa (to the detriment of the economies of the 1!kraine and 
Moldova). Frontier guards are generally COITUpt and. co~sequently the frontier betwe~n 
the Ukraine and the DMR is porous. Finally, the Ukrall1e IS Important as a fallback ally 111 
case Russia ever loses interest in Transdniestria. 
About a quarter of the population of the DMR is. of Uk.rainian ex~ra.ction. 
Vladimir Bodnar, a separatist leader from Timspol, is als~ preslde?t .ot the Asso~latlOn. of 
Ukrainians from Transdniestria. He frequently meets with Uknul11an leaders lI1c1udll1g 
the President Leonid Kuchma. During a discussion with representatives of the 
Government of the Republic of Moldova, Mr. Kuchma .declared tha~ t~le Ukraine would 
not support any economic blockade of the separatist regIOn because It IS po~ulate~ by so 
many Ukrainians. Tiraspol has signed bilateral .agreements of cooperatIon With the 
administrations of Odessa and Vinitsa in the Ukrall1e. These agreements could not have 
been concluded without the blessing of Kiev. The Ukraine is encouraging the expansion 
in of Ukrainian language education in the DMR by providing teachin~ m~terials and 
offering scholarships to Ukrainian universi~ies for grad:Jates of Transdn.testnan schools. 
Following the example of the Russian FederatIon, the Ukrmne encourages 
Transdniestrians to obtain Ukrainian citizenship. However, at present, the number of 
Ukrainian citizens in the DMR is only 2-3,000. Perhaps this is being done with an eye 
toward claiming historical Ukrainian rights over Tran~dni~stria if the Republic of 
Moldova is forced to officially concede the loss of Transdl11estna.. . ' 
According to provisions of a memora~dum regardmg regl~latlOn ot the 
Transdniestrian conflict signed on May 8, 1997 111 Moscow, the Ukrall1e, as well as 
Russia, has the status of "state-guarantor." In mid-1998 Ukrainian forces joined Russian, 
Moldovan and Transdniestrian troops in the security zone. . 
There are no official relations between Tiraspol and Bucharest. The separatist 
regime continues to pursue an anti-Romanian campaign. The campaign .has .two basic 
themes, one based on history and another based on recent events. T~e hlstoncal the~n~ 
draws on the experiences of Moldova in the inter-:var years. when Greater Rom.allla 
included most of what is now the Moldovan Republic and d:mng World War Two .Itself. 
During these years, DMR officials maintain, Romanian pohce cond.ucted a .campmgn of 
repression against Moldovan residents on the :vest bank of the D~lester ~Iv~r and al.so 
made routine incursions onto the Eastern bank 111 what was at that time palt of the Soviet 
Union. It was only through the intervention of the Ru~sians, they ins~st, that the people of 
this region were spared the brutality of virtual occ.u?atlon by tl~e NazIs. '. 
Recent events according to DMR authontles, have witnessed a Romalllan leturn 
to the practices of th~ 1940s. As evidence, they cite. alleged Romanian militar~ sup?ort 
for the Moldovan forces during the 1992 war. In partIcular, they charge, Romal11an pilots 
played an active combat role. Their military sel:vice .was au~~ented by a steady flow 
Romanian military hardware across the Prut RIVer l~tO Chlsmau. DMR spokesmen 
charge that Romanian military "adventurism" is now bemg replaced by a strident form of 
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"Romanian nationalism" that aims at the "destruction" of the non-Romanian communities 
on the eastern bank of the Dniester. 
Relati.ons between :rransdniestria. and R.o~ania are limited to the exchange of 
goods by private economic agents. TIllS traffiC IS rather limited and there are few 
Romanian commercial goods on sale in Tiraspol and the surrounding communities. More 
significant in economic terms is the fact that Transdniestria imports oil from Romania. As 
a pro~ucer of petroleum products, ROIT~ania is one of the few regional suppliers for 
essential energy resources. The uncertamty of the DMR economy and the attendant 
difficulties in assuring prompt payment, however, inhibit the expansion of this trade. The 
Rybnitsa Me.tallurgical Plant is also involved in trading with Romania since a major part 
of the metal It produces starts out as scrap metal from Romania. 
In the spring of 1992 four countries - Russia, Romania, the Ukraine and Moldova 
_ were involved in attempt to settle the Transdniestrian conflict, which, by then, had 
c1aime~ abOl~t a thousand lives. Representatives met in Chisinau, 6-17 April 1992. 
Romal11a, which was represented by Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, was the only country 
that supported ~oldova III accordance with international law. Unfortunately, a major 
battle broke out III Bender on June 18, 1992, causing the failure of the initiative. There is 
suspicion in Moldova that Russian secret services, wishing to eliminate Romania from 
~he. settlement of the Trat:s~niestria conflic~, were behind the outbreak. Certainly, the 
II1cldent worked to Russlll s advantage. SIIlce then, though the OSCE has become 
involved in negotiations, Russia has been in the driver's scat with regard to mediating the 
conflict. 
Relations with Gagauzia 
In the interests of keeping Moldova within the Russian orbit, Moscow has aided 
separatist~ not only in Transd.niestria but in Gagauzia as well. On September 26, 1990 
electlO~s Ill. th.e Supreme ~~vlet of the so-called "Autono~ous Soviet Socialist Gagauz 
Republic wlthIll the USSR were planned to take place. Mlrcea Druc, prime minister of 
Moldova, tried to stop those elections by force and sent several thousand "volunteers" to 
Gagauzia. That action intensified the opposition of Gagauz people towards Chisinau. In 
1994, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova granted autonomy to Gagauzia, but that 
has not solved the problem. Radical leaders from Gagauzia continued to accuse the 
authorities from Chisinau of aggravating the social-economic situation. 
Relations between Tiraspol and Comrat (the capital of Gagauzia) have been 
friendly. In I 99?,. while ~irc~a Druc's "volunteers" attempted to stop the Gagauz 
electIOns, the Ul11fled Council of Work Staffs from the DMR sent dozens of buses full of 
armed "guardians" to support the Gagauz separatists. 85 Tiraspol has also offered 
Gagauzi~ electricit~ produ.ced by the thermal-electric station in Cuciurgan. Significantly, 
even dunng such .tl.mes of econo~lic austerity in the DMR, Tiraspol's officials arranged 
to s~ll the ~Iectnclty to Gagauzla at a price well below the market value. In 1999, 
electlOn.s for the Popl:lar ~ssembly (a legislative body with 35 deputies) took place in 
Gagauzla. The extremist wIllg lecl by Mihail Kendighelean was the big electoral winner. 
On July 5, 2000 in Tiraspol, Grigore Marakutsa, president of Supreme Soviet of the 
:.'The USS~ also sent troops. It was .the ~rrival of tro~ps from the Interior Ministry that caused the armed 
vol~nleers to return to CllIslllau. 1111s mterventlon IS a major reason for Gagauzian warmth toward 
RUSSia. 
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. h'd b the first secre my 0' d Tabunshchlk, who a ?en d I .. t' lS 'IS Kendighelean, but his stance towar 
not as radical in his actions and ec at<lIOl , 
Chisinau is not very ~ifferent. \' f Moldova fared better than their comrades in 
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New Leadership and Old Issues 
Reasons for the Communist Victory 
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The victory of the Moldovan Communist Party (CP) during the parliamentary 
elections on February 25, 200 I had a dramatic impact on the Moldovan Republic and the 
stability of the DMR. This was the most attention focused on this region since the armed 
conflicts of 1992, The fact that the communist return to power came within the context of 
the democratization of the RM gave analysts great cause for concern, 
While the victory of the communists may have come as a surprise to casual 
Western observers, local analysts had long predicted victory for Voronin's party. The 
dimensions of that victory, however, were a surprise even to the communists themselves. 
Under Moldovan electoral law, the popular results gave them 71 out of 101 seats in the 
neW Parliament. 
The success of the communists may be attributed to several causes. The first and 
most obvious reason was expressed by the CP leader Vladimir Voronin in the immediate 
post-electoral period. At that time he stated that "the result of the elections represents not 
only the victory of the CP", but an overwhelming rejection of the current government and 
its policies. 
After Moldova declared its independence in 1991, the RM gained Western 
support as a result of its important geopolitical position. Consequently, Moldova began 
its reforms with significant Western encouragement and was soon recognized as a leader 
in the post-Soviet reform process. The small nation was routinely cited by Western 
authorities as being a leader of the reform process in the former USSR, Meanwhile, the 
notion of "reform" was accepted by the local population as the proper solution for 
Moldova'S problems. Unfortunately, the process of transforming the economy into a 
market system didn't bring benefits for most people. In fact, the standard of living for the 
average citizen declined during this period, A poor economic environment was coupled 
with political instability, endless and bitter power struggles, and instability in the political 
leadership. 
A second important factor in the communist victory was the astute political 
agenda established for the electoral campaign: the liberalization of prices, the 
reestablishment of order, social guarantees, participation in the Russian-Belarusian 
Union, and having Russian as the second official state language, All of these nostalgic 
promises were addressed to people who felt neglected during the ten post-communist 
years: the rural popUlation, Russian speakers who resented demands that they should 
learn Romanian and workers who suffered from non-payment of wages. 
A third reason for the communist victory was the ineffectiveness of other electoral 
competitors. The center-right political parties seemed concerned primarily with their 
internal relationships and failed to establish a favorable popular image in contrast to that 
of the communists, Had the center-right parties established a unified front, they would 
have won approximately the same number of votes as the communists. Throughout most 
of the year prior to the elections, the center-right leaders focused their greatest hostility 
on each other rather than on their communist rivals. 
Being unable to establish their own credibility as a governing force, the 
representatives of the center-right parties simply maintained that the communist party 
wasn't ready to govern. The communists, they insisted, would fail just as and the 
Moldovan Agrarian Democratic party failed when in controlled the government. Petru 
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Bogatu, writing in an editorial in Tara, predicted that a communist victory would bring 
two results: I) The Moldovan situation would become even worse than before and the 
government would once again lose popular confidence, 
2) Moldova's fledgling democratic system, built over the last decade, would 
collapse and take the economy down with it. 89 
Reactions to the Communist Victory 
The Romanian political elite, noW under the leadership of former communist Ion 
IIIiescu, was alarmed by the success of the Moldovan communists, One of Romania's 
leading journals declared that "Moldova has tragically and needlessly surrendered in 
front of the red tide", Yet, as it made this statement, the editorial suggested that Romania 
shares responsibility for this development because it failed to establish solid relations 
with its neighbor across the Prut.
90 
The Russian reaction, if one looks beyond official statements, reflects an element 
of ambivalence, While the Russian mass media was often effusive in its reactions to the 
elections, many analysts in Moscow, speaking unofficially, expressed both realism and 
reservations, Some expressed their concern that Moldova, if drawn considerably closer to 
the Russian Federation, might constitute a burden to the already burdened Russian-
Belarusian Union, Moldova, they observe, is the poorest country in Europe and the 
development of its national economy has been very slow, even by CIS standards, 
Moreover, such analysts maintain, Moscow's relationship with the United States may 
well be further complicated should the impression emerge that Russia is attempting to 
assimilate Moldova, 9t The official reaction of the DMR concerning the election results was rather 
cautious, In his first statement, DMR President Igor Smirnov insisted that "the leadership 
of DMR is waiting to see if Voronin's electoral promises are translated into reality," 92 
Independent observers in Tiraspol noted that the communist victory was not, in 
fact, welcomed by Tiraspol's leaders because they felt embarrassed by the dramatic 
power shift in Chisinau after so many years of denouncing Moldova as the main threat to 
its security, Even more important was their suspicion that MoscoW would clearly prefer 
Voronin to Smirnov in any Moldovan confrontation, Tiraspol's role as a "bridgehead of 
Russian interests" in Moldova was shattered and the value -in Moscow- of the 
Tiraspol leadership was seriously degraded, According to unofficial observers, 
Tiraspol's leadership fell into a state of panic in the aftermath of the February elections, 
The new environment prompted Smirnov to take what might be regarded as 
emergency actions to respond to this new "threat" to the DMR's stability, Non-
governmental organizations in Transdniestria, which, for the most part, are manipulated 
by the government, were quickly mobilized to counter any popular ambivalence about 
Tiraspol's relations with Chisinau, All NGO leaders suspected of weakness in the face of 
the new challenge were removed, Their replacements came from the ranks of the most 
hardline among the DMR leadership, Meanwhile, security forces were called upon to be 
89 Tara, 19 January 2001 
90 Evellilllellllli Zilei, 27 February 2001 
91 Interviews conducted the Moscow staff of the William R, Nelson Institute, March, 2001 
92 Evening News, ProTV, Chisinau, 28 February 2001 
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Federation where he discussed, among other things, relations with the DMR. On J 8- J 9 
April, Moldova has been already visited by Evghenii Primakov, the Head of the State 
Commission of the Russian Federation, visited Moldova in order to "discuss and clarify" 
the Transnistrean situation. 
The most significant of these events was the meeting on 9 April, which was 
initiated by President Voronin who viewed the meeting as a means of stimulating the 
negotiation process. Voronin and Smirnov were joined by several key officials: Vasile 
Sturza, the president of the State Committee for Solving the Transdniestrian conflict 
within the Government in Chisinau, William Hill, the OSCE representative in Moldova, 
Petro Cialii, the Ukrainian Ambassador to Moldova, and Aleksandr Novojilo, the 
representative of the Russian Presidency in the process of negotiation between Chisinau 
and Tiraspol. As the meeting began, Vasile Sturza, stressing a positive and optimistic 
attitude in Chisinau, declared Moldovan support for creating a new strategy for solving 
the Transnistrean conflict within the context of broader international participation in the 
forthcoming Bratislava meetings. Sturza's optimism was not immediately rewarded and 
Igor Smirnov continued to display what most observers regarded as an inflexible attitude. 
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At the conclusion of the meeting, the Chisinau-Tiraspol dialogue continued to be 
based on certain fundamental assumptions. First, the Moldovan Republic and the DMR 
represent two single subjects, equal in rights, and who maintain their sovereignty and 
legitimacy. The words "harmonization of customs and fiscal legislation ... ", noted in the 
concluding documents, acknowledge this position. Second, DMR authorities enjoy the 
same legitimacy as Moldovan officials. Voronin, by signing the conference document, 
committed Moldova to cancel the "customs and fiscal prohibitions of Moldova at the 
border of Transdniestria", thus acknowledging Smirnov's authority over "the state 
frontier" while making no reference to the border with the Ukraine. The word "conflict" 
does not appear in the document. 98 
Voronin's visit to the Russian Federation followed within only a few days. In 
fact, it came even before the Moldovan Parliament had selected the leaders of the new 
government. Yet, the results of the meetings are significant for the stability of the DMR. 
Voronin participated in a series of meetings with officials from the Russian Federation, 
including the leadership of "Gazprom". The latter meeting was especially significant in 
securing basic Moldovan energy needs but also represented the willingness of the 
Russian leadership to alleviate one of the key vulnerability of the Moldovan Republic. In 
taking such a step, Russia clearly identifies itself with Chisinau after many years of 
maintaining a more reserved position. 
Official Russian skepticism about Transdniestrian claims of "legality" were 
underlined by Evghenii Primakov during his two days in Chisinau. Sources on the 
Moldovan governmental commission for solving the Transdniestrian problem indicate 
that Primakov came to Chisinau to meet specialist groups from Chisinau and Tiraspol and 
to discuss with them a new project for determining the status of Transdniestria. The new 
project was developed by the Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE, with participation of 
Chisinau and Tiraspol. The project is generally referred to as the "Primakov project" 
and, in its initial form, called for the federalization of Moldova, a condition long rejected 
by Moldovan authorities. During his visit, Primakov also stated that the problem of 
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creation of business centers in the capitals of both states, construction of railroads with 
European gauge tracks, sustaining Moldovan efforts for adherence to the South Eastern 
European Stability Pact and other international organizations, and greater use of 
Romanian financial support for privatisation of energy, transport, and agricultural 
companies in Moldova. 
The tone of the new Moldovan foreign policy became clear by when Voronin, at 
the invitation of his Ukrainian counterpart, Leonid Kuchma, announced an official visit to 
Kiev. With this recognition of the importance of the Ukraine to the Moldovan agenda, 
Voronin has indicated that relations with Moscow, Bucharest and Kiev are Moldova's 
first concerns. Byelorussia is also considered important and Voronin quickly indicated his 
intention to visit this nation in the first days of his administration. 
Summary: Voronin as a Factor on the Stability of the DMR 
Vladimir Voronin, in his first actions as President, has indicated the following: 
He is willing to accept - if only for limited time - Igor Smirnov as a legitimate leader; 
He has a record of personal hostility toward Smirnov; 
He sees the DMR as a genuine state and is willing to recognize the DMR's 
sovereignty. 
He is willing to forgo the internationalization of the Transdniestrian dispute and will 
allow the Russian Federation to control resolution of this problem with Moldova and 
thereby guarantee Moldova's territorial integrity. 
He is apparently willing to accept a Russian military presence in Moldova. 
The position of the officials of the Russian Federation can be expressed in the 
following assumptions: 
The Russian Federation, even after the communist success in Moldova, seems 
reluctant to pressure Transdniestrian leaders. The Russian Federation apparently has no 
interest in reestablishment of the territorial integrity of Moldovan Republic. 
As a means of solving the Transdniestrian conflict, the Russian Federation intends 
to create a "guarantee" mechanism, through which it may direct the internal political 
processes in Moldova and maintain Moldova under its unofficial protection. This goal 
can be achieved by imposing the internal organization of a "common state", thus 
allowing Russia to control Moldova's behavior. The Primakov Memorandum of May 
1997 is a first step toward this goal. 
In spite of the fears of the DMR leadership, the Russian Federation is likely to 
continue to promote at least some elements of the separatist regime in Transdniestria. 
Should the DMR completely disintegrate, Moscow loses its status as "guarantor" of 
Moldova's security. Moldovan membership in the Russian-Belarus Union is not likely to 
change this. 
The Russian Federation's role in Moldova will be irreversibly legalized should 
the new government facilitate the privatization of key Moldovan industries by means of 
Russian economic agencies, especially those controlled by Russian criminal 
organizations. Russian "generosity" in supplying the DMR with natural gas at no charge 
for almost a decade indicates how such control may be developed. 103 
\OJ In the early days of the Voronin administration, Russia has indicated that it will demand cash payments 
for supplying natural gas to Moldova. 
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